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ENFORCEABILITY OF GUARANTIES MADE BY TEXAS
CORPORATIONS
by
George Slover*

O

NE of the most common problems confronting attorneys

practicing corporation law in Texas is determining whether,
in a given set of circumstances, a Texas corporation may make an
enforceable guaranty of the obligations of another person. Frequently, when a borrower is met by a requirement of additional
security, he will suggest that he can persuade some corporation
to offer to guaranty his obligations, either because he is an officer
or a major stockholder, or a good customer, or for some other reason is able to exert sufficient influence on the corporation. The
attorneys for the corporation and for the lender must then determine whether a guaranty made by the corporation will be valid
and enforceable. The question can arise, of course, not only in
connection with guaranties of indebtedness but in connection with
guaranties of leases, contracts, and other obligations.
There have been a number of Texas decisions bearing on this
problem. The general rule evolved by this authority is that a
guaranty by a corporation of the obligations of another person
will be enforceable only if it directly benefits the corporation in
the pursuit of the purposes for which it was created; a benefit
which is merely indirect or incidental is not sufficient. There are
two theories on which a corporate guaranty might be enforced. It
may be enforced because the benefits anticipated from the guaranty bring it within the implied powers of the corporation; or it
may be ultra vires but none the less enforceable because the corporation is estopped to assert ultra vires by reason of the benefits
actually received. Both bases of enforceability depend on the
benefits derived or to be derived by the corporation from the
guaranty, but it would seem that different results might be reached
in certain circumstances depending on whether the guaranty was
within the implied powers of the corporation or merely enforce*A.B., University of Tennessee, 1945; LL.B., Harvard School of Law, 1949; practicing with the firm of Carrington, Gowan, Johnson, Bromberg & Leads.
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able by reason of some sort of estoppel. For instance, the fact
that a contract of guaranty was still completely executory would
have no effect if the contract was within the implied powers of
a corporation; however, it might preclude enfoicement if the
contract is ultra vires and must depend for enforceability on
estoppel. The distinctions between these two bases of enforcement
have not been explicitly developed by the courts.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The old corporation statutes antedating the Texas Business Corporation Act' contained certain provisions sometimes cited by the
Texas courts when considering corporate guaranties. These were
found in Articles 1348 and 1349 2 and read as follows:
Art. 1348. No corporation, domestic or foreign, doing business in this
State shall create any indebtedness whatever except for money paid,
labor done which is reasonably worth at least the sum at which it was
taken by the corporation, or property actually received reasonably
worth at least the sum at which it was taken by the corporation.

Art. 1349. No corporation, domestic or foreign, doing
State, shall employ or use its stock, means, assets or
directly or indirectly for any purpose whatever other
plish the legitimate business of its creation, or those
wise permitted by law; ...

business in this
other property,
than to accompurposes other.

Actually these statutes probably added little if anything to the
common law as to corporate guaranties, and often the opinions
have not referred to these statutes at all. They are worded so
generally that in the usual situation they have been of limited
utility in determining whether a particular guaranty was enforceable, and recourse to the court decisions has been necessary.
The Texas Business Corporation Act provides no direct solution
to the problem of the enforceability of corporate guaranties,
although it should reduce the problem in certain respects for those
corporations governed by the new Act. The new Act contains no
provisions expressly dealing with corporate guaranties. The provisions most closely in point are found in Article 2.02A among the

general corporate powers set forth in that Article. These include
the following:
1 Tex. Acts 1955, c. 64.
2 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (1925)
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Art. 2.02. General Powers
A. Subject to the provisions of Section B and C of this Article.
each corporation shall have power:
(7) To purchase, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own,
hold, vote, use, employ, mortgage, lend, pledge, sell or otherwise dispose of, and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests
in, or obligations of, other domestic or foreign corporations, associations, partnerships, or individuals, or direct or indirect obligations of
the United States or of any other government, state, territory, government district, or municipality, or of any instrumentality thereof.
(9) To make contracts and incur liabilities, borrow money at such
rates of interest as the corporation may determine, issues its notes,
bonds, and other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by
mortgage or pledge of all or any of its property, franchises, and
income.
(10) To lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest
its funds, and take and hold real and personal property as security
for the payment of funds so loaned or invested.
While some of the transactions authorized by those provisions may
be the economic equivalent of a guaranty, none of the provisions
expressly authorize guaranties in so many words. Moreover, the
grant of powers contained in Article 2.02A must be considered in
context with the restrictions contained within Article 2.02B which
provides as follows:
B. Nothing in this Article grants any authority to officers or directors
of a corporation for the exercise of any of the foregoing powers, inconsistent with limitations on any of the same which may be expressly
set forth in this Act or in the articles of incorporation or in any other
laws of this State. Authority of officers and directors to act beyond the
scope of the purpose or purposes of a corporation is not granted by
any provisions of this Article.
Admittedly, there is nothing in the Act so inconsistent with the
direct benefit rule as to evidence a legislative intent to change the
rule by statute. And since authority to exercise the powers granted
by Section A of Article 2.02 is expressly limited through Section B
of that Article by the scope of the corporate purposes, one might
well ask how the Texas Business Corporation Act can have effected
any change at all from the old direct benefit rule evolved by the
courts. Nevertheless, in at least two respects the new Act should
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have an effect on the problem of corporate guaranties. In the
first 'place, the new Act permits incorporation for multiple purposes. Formerly, for a guaranty to be enforceable, it was necessary
to establish that it was calculated to produce a direct benefit to the
corporation in the pursuit of its single limited purpose drawn
from old Article 1302. Corporations incorporated under the new
Act will generally have much broader purpose clauses and accordingly the chances will be much better that the guaranty falls within
the scope of the corporate purposes. In the second place, Article
2.04 of the Act places new restrictions on the assertion of ultra
vires by or against corporations, although it by no means abolishes
the old doctrine. Consequently, even under the new Act it will still
be profitable to advert to the cases decided prior to its enactment for
guidance in determining whether there exists in the particular situation the type of direct benefit to the corporation in the pursuit of
its corporate purposes which will make a guaranty enforceable.
GUARANTIES FOR THE PRIMARY BENEFIT OF THE CORPORATION
AND ACCOMMODATION GUARANTIES

Sometimes there is a situation in which a contract is entered into
for the primary benefit of the corporation, but for some reason the
corporation appears in the capacity of guarantor rather than as the

primary obligor. Such a case in Gaston & Ayres v. J. I. Campbell
Company.' In that case, the vice-president of a corporation personally executed a note as maker and then endorsed it on behalf
of the corporation. Part of the proceeds of the note were used to

pay an existing indebtedness of the corporation. The remainder
of the proceeds appear to have been held as a credit to the account
of the corporation. The court held that the corporation was liable
for the full amount of the note to a holder in due course, empha-

sizing that the transaction was in reality by the corporation and for
the corporation. Situations of this type where the corporation is to
receive the primary benefit from the transaction, of course, present
the clearest case for enforcement of corporate guaranties.4
3 104 Tex. 576, 140 S.W. 770 (1911), modified on rehearing, 104 Tex. 585, 141 S.W.
515 (1911).
4 Waller v. Gorman Mercantile Co., 141 S.W. 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). Cf. North
Texas State Bank v. Crowley-Southerland Commission Co., 145 S.W. 1027 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1912) ; Malone v. Republic National Bank & Trust Co., 70 S.W. 2d 809 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) error dism.
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The converse type of situation is where the guaranty is made
solely as an accommodation to the other person without prospect of
benefit to the corporation. In line with the rule in other states,
Texas decisions have definitely established that this sort of noncharitable gift of corporate credit and property is invalid, and the
guaranty will not be binding on the corporation in the absence of
a further showing of facts sufficient to establish liability.5 In the
usual situation, however, the facts do not present a black and white
picture of a guaranty made for the primary benefit of the corporation or for the sole benefit of another person. Instead the transaction is usually admittedly for the primary benefit of another, and
the question is whether the corporation, too, receives such benefits
as will support the guaranty.
GUARANTIES FOR AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS

In the old case of Northside Railway Company v. Worthington,6
the Texas Supreme Court established the rule that the fact that corporations had common ownership and were otherwise economically
related would not of itself support a guaranty by one of indebtedness of the other. In that case, two corporations were organized by
substantially the same people and had the same officers and directors. The purpose of one was the purchase, subdivision, and sale of
land. The purpose of the other was the construction and maintenance of street railways. They were intended to be correlated
enterprises, one depending largely for its success upon the success
of the other, since the street railway was to serve the area being
developed by the land company. The land company needed money
to pay off an existing indebtedness, and the street railway company needed money for construction work. The two companies
jointly floated an issue of bonds, each company executing each
bond, in order to obtain this needed capital. The court held that
this action was ultra vires, insofar as it represented an extension
of credit by one of the companies in aid of the other, and that each
5Brand v. Eastland County Lumber Co., 77 S.W. 2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ;
McCaleb v. Boerne Electric Power & Mfg. Co., 173 S.W. 1191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915)
error dism.; South Texas National Bank v. LaGrange Oil Mill Co., 40 S.W. 328 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1897) error ref.
688 Tex. 562, 30 S.W. 1055 (1895).
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corporation was liable only proportionately to the amount of the
proceeds of the bonds received by it.
That the success of the one enterprise tended to promote the success
of the other was not itself sufficient to authorize the one corporation
was to accrue
to aid the other, for the reason that the benefit which
7
was not the direct result of the means employed.
Where the corporate guarantor and the primary obligor are
related only because of interlocking directors and officers or common ownership, and do not have other common interests, then the
rationale of the Worthington case applies even more strongly and
the guaranty is clearly unenforceable.8
GUARANTIES FOR SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS

Corporations which possess a parent-subsidiary relationship
present a situation distinguishable from the case of corporations
which merely have common ownership. In the case of common
ownership, if one corporation prospers, this will not directly benefit the other corporation as such and only by disregarding the corporate entities of the two corporations can we say that the other
corporation also benefits since the common stockholders benefit.
On the other hand, in the case of parent and subsidiary corporations, if the subsidiary prospers the parent also prospers through
the increase in the value of the stock of the subsidiary. This distinction was observed in Baker v. Edson Hotel OperatingCo.? The
involved fact situation in that case may be summarized as follows.
Two corporations sold lots to a third corporation in exchange for
capital stock of the third corporation. The first two corporations
also purcased bonds issued by the first corporation to finance construction by it of a hotel which was then leased to a fourth corporation which was to operate the hotel. The third corporation owned
25 percent of the stock of the fourth corporation, and subsequently,
the first two corporations purchased the remaining 75 percent of
the stock of the fourth corporation, one taking 50 percent and the
7 88 Tex .562, 570, 30 S.W. 1055, 1057 (1895). Also See Rio Grande Valley Gas Co. v.
Grand Rapids Store Equipment Corporation, 57 S.W. 2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
8 McCaleb v. Boerne Electric Power & Mfg. Co., 173 S.W. 1191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915)
error dism.; Kaplan Dry Goods Co. v. Sanger Bros., 214 S.W. 485 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919). Cf. Taylor Feed Pen Co. v. Taylor National Bank, 215 S.W. 850 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1919).
9 99 S.W. 2d 998 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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other taking 25 percent. By the same resolutions authorizing the
purchase of this stock, the first two corporations also authorized
loans to the fourth corporation and authorized endorsement of
certain notes of the fourth corporation. This suit was brought on
those notes. The court held that the endorsement of the notes of the
fourth corporation was not ultra vires, stating:
If these corporations had the corporate right to purchase and hold
the stock of the Baker-Beaumont Hotel Company-and, as just stated,
that right is not denied by any party to this suit-then these holding
corporations had the right to protect their investment. It would be a
strange rule of law to give these holding companies the right to purchase and hold stock in the Baker-Beaumont Hotel Company, and then
to deny them the right to protect the solvency of their investment.1 0
A similar case is Ingran v. Texas Christian University. 1 It
appeared that the medical school of Texas Christian University
was a separate corporation with its own board of directors. As an
auxiliary and correlated school of the University, however, it occupied a position analogous to that of a subsidiary corporation. In
order to obtain facilities for the establishment of a hospital to be
used by the Medical School, the University leased certain property
and then sublet it to the College Hospital Association, a separate
corporation formed to operate the hospital. For the purposes of its
opinion, the court treated the transaction as if the University had
guaranteed performance of the lease by the hospital corporation,
and held that this was not ultra vires.
GUARANTIES FOR EMPLOYEES

The leading Texas case on guaranties made for employees is
L. G. Balfour Co. v. Gossett.12 It was alleged that the company had
guaranteed the indebtedness of its regional manager. In answer to
a defense of ultra vires, it was contended that the corporation should
be estopped to plead the defense of ultra vires, because the corporation received benefits from its contract in that if the manager's
business should prosper and be properly financed, he might sell
more of the goods of the corporation. The court held that this was
10 99 S.W. 2d 998, 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
11 196 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.
12131

Tex. 348, 115 S.W. 2d 594 (1938).
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not the sort of direct benefit which would justify the application of
an estoppel.
A similar case is Al & Lloyd Parker, Inc., v. Cameron County
Lumber Co."3 The Al Parker Securities Company, a corporation,
sold a tract of land to J. A. Schulgen retaining a vendor's lien for
the balance due on the purchase price. Schulgen built a house on
the lot with materials furnished by plaintiff, giving therefor a
note for $1,500.00 endorsed by his employer, Al & Lloyd Parker,
Inc., which it was alleged was indebted to him in the sum of
$1,800.00 and, therefore, additionally interested in helping him
get the improvements. Moreover, it appeared that the two corporations were closely related and that the two Parker Brothers owned
most of the stock of each, and it was contended that the guarantor
corporation would benefit in that the security for the vendor's
lien note of the other corporation would be enhanced by the improvements. The court held that all of these alleged benefits were
insufficient to estop Al & Lloyd Parker, Inc., from asserting the
defense of ultra vires.
GUARANTIES FOR CUSTOMERS

Other than cases involving mere gratuitous accomodation guaranties, probably more decisions deal with guaranties for customers
than for any other type of guaranty. The leading case is W. C.
Bowman Lumber Company v. Pierson.4 In that case a lumber
company executed the bond of a contractor covering a certain building for which he had bought the necessary lumber and other materials from the lumber company. Pointing out that no issue of
estoppel had been raised by the pleadings, the supreme court held
the pledge of credit by the lumber company was ultra vires and
stated broadly,
It is not a fostering of the business of a corporation to pledge its capital
of
as security for the debts of prospective customers for the purpose
5
enabling them to buy its wares. It is inviting its destruction.'
Another type of guaranty for the benefit of a customer was involved in Deaton Grocery Co. v. International Harvester Co. of
13 56 S.W. 2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), aff'd, 122 Tex. 487, 62 S.W. 2d 63 (1933).
14 110 Tex. 543, 221 S.W. 930 (1920).
15 110 Tex. 543, 545, 221 S.W. 930, 931 (1920).
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America."' In that case, a customer of the guarantor corporation
was indebted to the Harvester Company. There was testimony that
the customer was also heavily indebted to the guarantor corporation
and that the guaranty was made to obtain an extension of time on
the Harvester Company debt in order to prevent a collapse-of the
customer's business. The court held that even assuming that the
customer had been insolvent at the time the guaranty was made and
that by reason of the extension of time on the indebtedness, the
guarantor corporation collected more from the customer than it
would have otherwise, still the guaranty was ultra vires and not
binding on the corporation. A similar case in which the benefits
received by the corporation were more direct and ascertainable
and in which a different result was reached is H. Seay & Co. v.
Moore. 7 In that case, a customer of a bank was indebted to it for
loans made to finance the purchase of cotton. The bank guaranteed
the plaintiff against any loss on account of the purchase on consignment from the customer of 300 bales of cotton. The bank received all sums advanced under the contract by plaintiff and applied
these to the customer's indebtedness. The court held that the guaranty was enforceable."i
CONCLUSION

A review of the Texas cases shows that the Texas courts have
been most diligent in protecting those interested in the corporate
assets from dissipation of those assets by the officers and directors
of the corporation through improvident guaranties. Perhaps they
have been too diligent, and the overall interests of Texas corporations have accordingly suffered. To hold unenforceable a guaranty made by a corporation purely for the accommodation of a
third person without prospect of benefit to the corporation would
necessarily be favorable to the corporation. On the other hand, there
are many occasions on which sound business judgment would call
for the execution of a guaranty, even though it did not fall within
the restrictive interpretation of the "direct-benefit" test heretofore
16 105 S.W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
17 265 S.W. 376 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
18 Other cases involving guaranties for customers are Parlin & Orendorff Implement
Co. v. Frey, 200 S.W. 1143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) error ref., certiorari denied, 250
U.S. 640 (1919) ;Munoz v. Brassel, 108 S.W. 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), error ref.
Cf. Long Bell Lumber Company v. Hampton, 20 S.W. 2d 1081 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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adopted by the courts. Guaranties executed for customers, employees, or others having a special relationship to the corporation
might, in the long run, produce profits for the corporation far outweighing the risk of loss attendant upon the guaranty. It would
seem to be to the advantage of the corporation to be able to make
an enforceable guaranty in such circumstances, or the corporation
may be handicapped in competing with unincorporated competitors.
As a practical matter, many guaranties are undoubtedly made
and honored by Texas corporations in such circumstances, even
though they would not be enforceable in the courts. And the courts
may consider that it is sufficient for them to enforce liability in the
clear cases in which an undisputable direct benefit to the corporation can be shown, leaving enforcement of guaranties where there
is only an indirect benefit to trade practices and customs.
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